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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY

Iraq

REPORT NO.

25X1A

SUBJECT

Communist Party Program to Recruit
Members and Gain Sympathizers

DATE DISTR.

7 August 1953

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2

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REFERENCES

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

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1. The Communist Party of Iraq has issued orders to its members and, through them, to its sympathizers, that each member or sympathizer is to visit one of his relatives or friends in the poorer quarters of Baghdad each Friday. Shortly thereafter, active¹ Party members will begin to make the visits with the individual members or sympathizers.²
2. When the pattern of the visits has been set and the active members have been established as friends of the family group into which they have been introduced, these members will take advantage of the meetings to spread communist propaganda by discussing national and international affairs, the peace movement, the needs of the workers and farmers, and the like.
3. The active Party members will assess the reaction of the members of the family groups to the propaganda which is spread among them in this fashion. Where an individual appears to be particularly susceptible, the propaganda will be intensified and, if the individual develops properly, an attempt will be made to recruit him as a member of the Party.


Comments:

1. Through his use of the word "active," [] draws a definite line of distinction in this case. The majority of Party members only participate in Party activities when the Party is strong, as it was in November 1952. "Active" members may, for purposes of terminology, be considered as hard-core, dedicated Communists. 25X1X
2. This report brings out what must be considered the most relevant factor in considering the strength of the Party in Iraq, i.e. that the Party's strength lies in its sympathizers and front organizations. "Active"

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Party members are few in number and the Party itself is not very well organized. However, in time of political unrest, the usually silent Party sympathizers become a strong and violent force, as witness the events of November 1952. That the Party itself is well aware of this fact is evident from its ceaseless efforts to justify its policies to those sympathizers through the medium of propaganda.

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